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Four Questionable Rationales for the
Patent Misuse Doctrine
Thomas F. Cotter*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a series of cases dating from the middle of the twentieth
century the United States Supreme Court held that if a patent
infringement defendant could demonstrate that the patent
owner had misused its patent, the patent would be rendered
unenforceable unless and until the misuse was purged. 1 The
Court has never clearly defined the term “misuse,” however. 2
Nor has it presented a coherent articulation of the policies that
underlie the doctrine, though in some cases it has drawn on
competition and patent exhaustion principles, 3 and it has
analogized the doctrine to the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands. 4 Notwithstanding the relation of misuse to competition
policy, however, the Court also has intimated that misuse and

© 2011 Thomas F. Cotter.
* Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I
prepared this essay for presentation at the Antitrust and Innovation
Symposium, Stanford School of Law, Stanford, California, in May 2010, and
presented a revised version of the essay at the University of Wisconsin Law
School in February 2011. I thank Nicholas Tymoczko for research assistance
and conference/workshop participants for useful comments and critique. Any
errors that remain are mine.
1. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670
(1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491–94 (1942),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28 (2006).
2. It has, for example, referred to misuse as “attempts to broaden the
physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly,” Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971), but as discussed below
definitions that refer to patent scope raise as many questions as they answer.
3. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive
Harm, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 101, 120–23 (2011).
4. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492–93.
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substantive antitrust law are not necessarily coextensive; 5 and
misuse clearly departs from antitrust in terms of both remedy
(unenforceability of the misused patent, instead of treble
damages) 6 and standing (any patent defendant may assert the
misuse defense, even if he or she is not a victim of the misuse). 7
In recent years, most of the significant misuse cases have come
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which defines patent misuse as the “impermissibly
broaden[ing of] the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of a patent with
anticompetitive effect.” 8 Like the Supreme Court precedents,
this definition too suggests a connection between misuse and
competition policy but leaves many of the details unclear. In
addition, a few other courts have extended the misuse concept
to copyright law, with varying definitions and articulations of
policy. 9
Scholars who have written about misuse, including
Christina Bohannan, 10 John Cross and Peter Yu, 11 Robin
Feldman, 12 and me, 13 have identified (or in some instances
have inspired me to imagine) various policies that might be
advanced by the patent and copyright misuse doctrines.
Limiting the present discussion to patent misuse in particular,
it is useful to distinguish four different rationales that
5. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140
(1969); Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490, 494.
6. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
7. See id. at 494.
8. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
343 (1971)). The court reaffirmed this definition in Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n (Princo II), 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010), petition for cert.
filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2011) (No. 10-898).
9. See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d
640, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2003) (dicta); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204–06 (3d Cir. 2003); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v.
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1990).
10. See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV.
475 (2011).
11. See John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu, Competition Law and Copyright
Misuse, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 427 (2008).
12. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent
Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003).
13. See Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901 (2007)
[hereinafter Cotter, Misuse]; Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in
Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 498–506, 539–41
(2006) [hereinafter Cotter, Procompetitive].
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plausibly could support a patent misuse doctrine. The first
rationale proposes that, to the extent misuse is coextensive
with substantive antitrust law, it serves the legitimate purpose
of discouraging antitrust violations that otherwise might go
undetected or unenforced. I will refer to this rationale as the
“optimal deterrence of substantive antitrust violations”
rationale, or “optimal antitrust deterrence” for short. A second
possible rationale is that misuse doctrine constrains
intellectual property (IP) owners from engaging in certain types
of conduct that, on balance, threaten to impose greater social
costs than social benefits, but that neither antitrust nor other
IP doctrines otherwise would forbid. I will refer to this as the
“social welfare” rationale. The third rationale in a sense
combines the first two by positing that courts can employ the
misuse doctrine to discourage conduct (1) that threatens
anticompetitive harm (for example, by reducing the dynamic
efficiency gains from future innovation) that may be too
tenuous or speculative for antitrust purposes; and (2) the
toleration of which is unlikely to have adequate offsetting
positive effects on the patent incentive scheme. In other words,
perhaps in some instances involving patent-related conduct,
the expected harm from “false negatives” (wrongly exonerating
anticompetitive conduct) outweighs the expected harm from
“false positives” (wrongly condemning procompetitive or
competitively neutral conduct); if antitrust is not designed to
handle such cases very well, then perhaps IP law can address
them by characterizing the conduct at issue as, in appropriate
circumstances, misuse. I will refer to this rationale as the
“optimal deterrence of anticompetitive conduct that lies beyond
the reach of antitrust” rationale, or “beyond antitrust” for
short. The fourth rationale casts the misuse doctrine as a tool
for preventing IP owners from using the threat of litigation to
encroach upon the public domain. In theory, this “public
domain” 14 rationale could apply to some exercises of patent, as
well as copyright, rights.
To cut to the chase, I remain skeptical of the first rationale
as a justification for a misuse standard that does nothing more

14. I will use the same the term used by Professor Bohannan for this
rationale, although she appears to confine this rationale to the realm of
copyright misuse. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 497–500. She also applies
this rationale to licensing and technological restrictions on the public domain,
not just to encroachments resulting from the threat of litigation, see id., but I
will confine my discussion to the latter. See infra Part V.
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than mirror substantive antitrust law. Although the second
and third rationales may have merit in some specific instances,
for the most part I think it would be a mistake to adopt a
misuse standard that is substantially more expansive than the
parallel antitrust standards. The fourth rationale provides a
plausible reason for classifying a subset of copyright owner
behavior as misuse but probably should not be extended to the
patent realm. Notwithstanding the efforts of gifted scholars to
justify the patent misuse doctrine, the doctrine’s theoretical
foundations remain shaky.
Parts II through V discuss each of the four rationales
sketched out above. Part VI concludes.
II. OPTIMAL DETERRENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE ANTIRUST
VIOLATIONS
In some cases, offenses that constitute misuse also
constitute violations of substantive antitrust law. The most
obvious example is tying, which is sometimes an antitrust
offense 15 and sometimes an act of patent misuse as well. 16 To
be sure, under current law, it is not entirely clear that misuseby-tying and tying as an antitrust offense are identical. 17
15. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink., Inc.,
547 U.S. 28 (2006).
16. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491–94
(1942), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep.
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
17. For tying to constitute a “per se” violation of the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff must prove (1) market power in the market for the tied good; (2) that
the tying and tied goods are separate products, meaning that there is separate
consumer demand for the two; (3) that consumers are coerced into buying the
tied product with the tying product; and (4) foreclosure of a substantial volume
of commerce in the market for the tied good. See United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Some courts have required proof of
additional elements, such as anticompetitive effect in the market for the tied
good, see, e.g., United Farmers Agents Ass’n v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 F.3d
233, 235 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996); Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous. Dev.
Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1516–17 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Yentsch v. Texaco,
Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56–57 (2d Cir. 1980)), or that the defendant has an economic
interest in the market for the tied product. See, e.g., Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis.
MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 316–17 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d
at 89–97 (applying a rule of reason analysis to allegations that Microsoft
illegally tied its operating system and browser). The defendant also may assert
as a defense the procompetitive benefits of the tie. See Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 34 n.1 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Jerrold Elecs.
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559–60 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per
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Moreover, under current law some conduct that rarely would
violate the antitrust laws constitutes misuse; extracting a
promise to pay patent royalties after the expiration of a patent
is the leading example. 18 There also remains considerable
curiam)); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 n.16 (E.D.
Mich. 1998). Moreover, although patents and copyrights were at one time
presumed to confer market power, that is no longer the case in antitrust tying
cases since Illinois Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45–46. Note also that, although I
have used the words “goods,” “products,” and “purchase” in the preceding
sentences, tying law can come into play regardless of whether the defendant
tied services or patents, see, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424
F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (considering legality, under the patent misuse
doctrine, of patent-to-patent tying), or whether the defendant used sales or
other transactional forms to effect the tie. Clayton Act § 3, for example, though
it applies only to ties of “commodities,” specifically refers to leases as well as
sales and to both patented and unpatented commodities. See 15 U.S.C. § 14
(2006). Although some courts have stated that it may be easier to prove a
violation of Clayton Act § 3 than of Sherman Act § 1, see, e.g., Allied
Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 996 n.1
(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing exclusive dealing claims), the dominant view is that
the substantive standards for tying claims under the two statutes is identical.
See, e.g., De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996).
Since the passage of the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, for tying
to constitute patent misuse the infringement defendant similarly has had to
prove market power in the market for the tying product or patent. See Pub. L.
No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(5) (2006)). Although one court appears to have concluded that, in
enacting the Reform Act, Congress intended for patent misuse by tying to be
evaluated under the rule of reason, see In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent
& Contract Litig., 850 F. Supp. 769, 777 (S.D. Ind. 1994), the Federal Circuit
has yet to consider this argument. See U.S. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1186 n.1.
Moreover, although some Federal Circuit case law characterizes the elements
of patent misuse by tying as being distinct from the elements of tying as an
antitrust violation, the court’s decision in U.S. Philips appears largely to
equate the two—or perhaps to make misuse by tying more difficult to prove
than antitrust tying by expressly requiring proof of anticompetitive effect in
the market for the tied patent. Compare Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d
661, 670 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that antitrust tying law requires a
determination of whether two separate goods, as defined by consumer
demand, are being tied, whereas the law of misuse “need not look to consumer
demand (which may be non-existent) but need look only to the nature of the
claimed invention as the basis for determining whether a product is a
necessary concomitant of the invention or an entirely separate product”), with
U.S. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1193–94; Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 920. At
the same time, there remain some species of conduct that constitute per se
misuse that do not violate the antitrust laws, and vice versa. See infra notes
18–19 and accompanying text.
18. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30–34 (1964); Va. Panel Corp. v.
MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Brulotte has been widely,
and justly, criticized as resting on flawed economic reasoning. See, e.g., 1
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 3.3c1, at 3-30 to -31 (2d ed.
2010); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
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uncertainty concerning just how much patent-related conduct
that violates the antitrust laws constitutes patent misuse as
well. 19 Nevertheless, under the Federal Circuit’s general
framework for evaluating alleged misuse, if the challenged
conduct is neither per se legal nor per se illegal, and if it is not
“reasonably within the patent grant,” then the legality of the
practice is determined under a rule of reason inquiry borrowed
directly from antitrust. 20 In any event, one surely could
envision a world in which only patent-related conduct that
violates the antitrust laws could be characterized as misuse.
Under this standard, conduct that is lawful under the antitrust
laws could never constitute misuse. 21
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 380–81, 417–18 (2003).
19. See U.S. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1185–86 (“[By enacting 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d),] Congress has declared certain practices not to be patent misuse even
though those practices might otherwise be subject to scrutiny under antitrust
law principles.”); accord Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Princo II), 616
F.3d 1318, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3435
(U.S. Jan. 5, 2011) (No. 10-898). A possible, though rare, example might be a
unilateral refusal to license a patent. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006)
(stating that a refusal to license a patent does not constitute misuse), with In
re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(holding that in rare cases a unilateral refusal to license a patent may violate
Sherman Act § 2). Similarly, in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the court affirmed a jury verdict that a design change
that made it more difficult for purchasers to obtain spare parts from anyone
other than the patentee constituted a violation of Sherman Act § 2, in light of
evidence that the patentee had market power for the replacement part and
that the design change actually reduced the product’s technical functionality.
Id. at 1381–83. The court nevertheless reversed a finding that the patentee
had committed misuse on the grounds that (1) the jury instruction on misuse
was too vague, and (2) the patentee’s conduct was not per se misuse and fell
reasonably within the scope of the patent grant. See id. at 1372–73.
20. Va. Panel Corp, 133 F.3d at 869 (quoting Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.3d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
21. Indeed, one might argue that under an “optimal antitrust deterrence”
rationale it would make sense to characterize any patent-related conduct in
violation of the antitrust laws as patent misuse. In practice, however, conduct
that violates the antitrust laws does not always equate with misuse. See supra
note 19. Arguably a common theme in misuse cases is that the patentee
allegedly used the patent to obtain something qualitatively different from that
to which the patent entitled him (for example, the patent enabled him to exert
control over nonpatented subject matter or to inhibit competition from
noninfringing products), and not simply to charge a monopoly price as a
consequence of, say, patent-related price fixing or market allocation. Perhaps
this distinction is what the Federal Circuit is getting at when it asks whether
the practice allegedly constituting misuse is “reasonably within the grant.”
Alternatively, perhaps the misuse doctrine should not render a patent
unenforceable where the anticompetitive conduct arises out of a collateral
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Equating misuse with violations of substantive antitrust
law nevertheless raises the obvious question of why a misuse
doctrine (so construed) would be necessary, given the existence
of substantive antitrust law. One possible answer would be that
misuse doctrine could promote the optimal enforcement of
antitrust standards. Perhaps in the absence of a patent misuse
doctrine many patent-related antitrust violations would go
unremedied; or perhaps the social costs of litigating such
violations as misuse are lower than the costs of litigating them
as antitrust violations. 22 To illustrate, consider the facts of case
recently decided by the en banc Federal Circuit, Princo Corp. v.
International Trade Commission (Princo II). 23 The dispute
centers around a cross-licensing arrangement or patent pool
involving various patents relating to “Orange Book” compliant
recordable compact discs (CD-Rs) and rewritable compact discs
(CD-RWs). 24 Philips, Sony, and other patent owners
established the pool in the 1990s. 25 As part of the arrangement,
Philips was authorized to grant nonexclusive package licenses
to any firms wishing to make Orange Book compliant discs. 26
agreement between the patentee and others. This was the position advanced
by U.S. Philips in the Princo II matter discussed in the text above, see Brief for
Intervenor U.S. Philips Corp. on Rehearing en Banc, Princo Corp. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 79
U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2011) (No. 10-898) (No. 2007-1386), and adopted
by the en banc court. See Princo II, 616 F.3d at 1334. If some such limitation
did not exist, the risk of overdeterrence I flag in the text above might be even
greater: would all of the patents in a patent pool potentially be rendered
unenforceable if the pool enables illegal price fixing or (as alleged in the Princo
II case discussed above) technology suppression?
As for the other part of the Federal Circuit’s definition—requiring that
the broadening be “with anticompetitive effect”—not all broadening of patent
scope is unlawful. The doctrine of equivalents, when it applies, results in a
broadening of literal patent scope, but it does so lawfully. See WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
22. See, e.g., Cross & Yu, supra note 11, at 454–55 (discussing copyright
misuse in particular).
23. 616 F.3d 1318. See also Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Princo I),
563 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 583 F.3d 1380 (en banc) (per curiam).
Princo I & II are the same case as U.S. Philips. The pending en banc appeal
involves certain issues that were left unresolved by the initial International
Trade Commission (ITC) proceeding and the first Federal Circuit appeal. See
U.S. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1198–99 (remanding for ITC consideration of these
issues).
24. Princo II, 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo I, 563 F.3d at 1303; U.S. Philips,
424 F.3d at 1182.
25. See Princo II, 616 F.3d at 1322.
26. Princo I, 563 F.3d at 1303 & n.1 (“Philips made available a joint
license to the pooled CD-R patents held by Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden and
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Philips was not authorized, however, to license any of the
patents on an individual basis. 27 Among the patents included
in the pool are Philips’s Raaymakers patents, which teach and
claim an analog modulation method for solving a particular
technical problem relating to compact discs. 28 Another patent
included in the pool, Sony’s Lagadec patent, principally teaches
and claims a digital solution to the same problem, although
Claim 6 of Lagadec arguably reads on both digital and analog
methods. 29 Orange Book compliant discs employ the analog
method, and these discs would not work in a CD recorder made
for use with discs produced using the digital method. 30 Certain
CD makers charged with patent infringement asserted that the
agreement between Philips and Sony to include the Lagadec
patent in the pool effectively amounts to an agreement to
suppress a potential rival (digital) technology and thus
amounts to misuse of the Lagadec patent. 31 A panel of the
Federal Circuit reversed the International Trade Commission’s
(ITC) entry of judgment for Philips and remanded the case for
further consideration of whether Sony and Philips agreed to

a joint license to the pooled CD-RW patents held by Philips, Sony, and Ricoh,”
as well as a Philips-only license in 2000 and “packages including only patents
that Philips deemed ‘essential’ to the manufacture of Orange Book compliant
compact discs” in 2001).
27. Id. at 1303.
28. Id. at 1305–06.
29. Id. at 1305–06, 1309–10 (“Philips maintains that Claim 6 is broadly
written to cover recordable compact discs containing a wobbled pregroove
formed by ‘a first signal . . . that has been modulated by a second signal that
contains coded information,’ and does not require the use of any particular
type of modulation (for example, digital modulation).”) (alteration in original).
30. Id. at 1310.
31. Id. at 1313 (“Princo argues that Philips and Sony agreed not to license
Lagadec in a way that would allow a competitor ‘to develop, use or license the
[Lagadec] technology to create a competing product.’”) (alteration in original);
see also Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Princo II), 616 F.3d 1318, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In the course of proceedings before an administrative law
judge, Princo raised the affirmative defense of patent misuse.”), petition for
cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2011) (No. 10-898). Assuming the
theory is valid, is it correct to say that Philips misused Lagadec (which Sony
owns and Philips licenses), or did Philips only misuse the two Raaymakers
patents (which Philips owns)? Did Philips misuse all of the licensed patents it
owns? All the patents it licenses? During the en banc oral argument, Judge
Moore expressed concern that Princo’s theory implies that all of the pooled
patents were misused. Oral Argument at 12:05, Princo II, 616 F.3d 1318 (No.
2007-1386-2), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/20071386-2.mp3.
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suppress the rival technology taught by Lagadec. 32 The Federal
Circuit thereafter decided to rehear the case en banc, however,
and in August 2010, the en banc court affirmed the ITC.33
In affirming the ITC, the en banc court concluded that (1)
patent misuse can arise only from leveraging a patent to
impose conditions of use that extend the scope of the grant and
have anticompetitive effect, and not from “collateral”
agreements; (2) because Philips did not leverage the
Raaymakers patents, it did not commit misuse; and (3) Princo
did not establish that the alleged agreement between Philips
and Sony had anticompetitive effects, that is, “a ‘reasonable
probability’ that the Lagadec technology, if available for
licensing, would have matured into a competitive force in the
storage technology market.” 34 To illustrate my argument about
misuse and antitrust deterrence, however, suppose that the
evidence in Princo II was clear that Sony and Philips had
agreed to suppress a rival technology, out of concern that that
technology would in time enable competition against the
technology incorporated in the Orange Book standard. 35 Such
an agreement could be a violation of the Sherman Act, insofar
as two competitors would be agreeing not to compete in (what I
shall assume is) a properly-defined product market. (On the
other hand, it is conceivable that the agreement could be lawful
under the rule of reason, to the extent that Sony and Philips
32. Princo I, 563 F.3d at 1321 (“We vacate and remand for the limited
purposes of determining . . . whether Princo has established that Sony and
Philips agreed that Lagadec would not be licensed in a manner allowing its
development as competitive technology.”).
33. Princo II, 616 F.3d 1318. The en banc court reinstated portions of the
panel opinion that had rejected other arguments Princo had raised on appeal.
See id. at 1326 n.1.
34. See id. at 1328–38. Judge Prost, joined by Judge Mayer, concurred on
the issue of absence of anticompetitive effects while “reserv[ing] judgment on
the precise metes and bounds of the patent misuse doctrine.” See id. at 1340–
41 (Prost, J., concurring in part). Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Gajarsa,
dissented. See id. at 1341–57 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
35. The court explicitly did not reach this issue. See id. at 1338. Another
possible example—albeit one on which I offer no opinion at present, and which
might possibly be more appropriate for consideration in connection with the
rationales discussed in Parts III and IV below—is whether a drug company’s
alleged improper listing in the FDA’s Orange Book for the purpose of fending
off generic competition otherwise permitted under the Hatch-Waxman Act
could constitute a type of patent misuse. See Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco
Pharm. Labs., 601 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (declining to address the
issue); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Wockhardt, Ltd., No. 1:08-cv-1547-WTL-TAB, 2010
WL 2605855, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2010) (permitting leave to amend to
assert a misuse argument).
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were engaged in a joint venture to develop the Orange Book
standard, and an agreement not to undercut the venture by
competing against it could be viewed as ancillary to the
venture’s purpose. 36 For present purposes, I express no view on
which outcome would have been correct on the facts, had the
court found such an agreement to have been present.) Even so,
the agreement might otherwise evade antitrust scrutiny for a
variety of reasons. Neither the Department of Justice nor the
Federal Trade Commission might consider the matter worth
the investment of their time and effort. Private parties as well
might not find it in their interest to commence an antitrust
action if the expected damages recovery is small, as it might be
here. Even if one could prove an anticompetitive agreement
between Sony and Philips, it might be very difficult to quantify
with sufficient certainty the lost profits flowing from the
nondevelopment of the rival technological solution. 37 In a case
like Princo II, then, maybe misuse does fill a gap in antitrust
coverage by providing an incentive to challenge anticompetitive
conduct that otherwise would go unchallenged. 38 In a similar
36. See Princo II, 616 F.3d at 1338–40 (noting that the “suppression of
nascent threats can be construed as anticompetitive behavior under certain
circumstances,” but concluding that Princo bore the burden of proving, and
had failed to prove, more than just a “speculative possibility” of
anticompetitive harm).
37. Perhaps such a rival solution would have pressured the contributors
to the patent pool to reduce the price of their package license, but only if the
rival solution would have become a viable competitor. The success of the rival
solution but for the agreement to suppress it might be hard to prove, however;
indeed, the harm to any individual licensee or prospective licensee may well be
too speculative to satisfy current standards relating to antitrust injury and
antitrust standing. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977) (stating that a private antitrust “[p]laintiff[] must prove
antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts
unlawful.”); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540–45 (1983) (discussing additional factors,
including the “directness or indirectness of the asserted injury,” the
speculative nature of any damages sought, and the potential for duplicative
recoveries, to consider in evaluating whether a private plaintiff has “antitrust
standing”). And yet the agreement to suppress could be anticompetitive
nonetheless, if it is unnecessary to the success of the joint venture.
38. Princo II, 616 F.3d at 1350 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“The majority
suggests that asserting a patent misuse defense against the patent covering
the suppressed technology (here, Lagadec) or an antitrust suit would provide a
remedy for anticompetitive behavior. The clear ineffectiveness of both of these
remedies demonstrates the importance of a misuse defense against the
protected patents (here, the Raaymakers patents). There is no realistic
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vein, perhaps one could argue that current antitrust standing
doctrine screens out too many otherwise valid antitrust claims.
If so, then misuse doctrine (unconstrained as it is by a standing
requirement) could be a step towards achieving optimal
antitrust enforcement and deterrence.
That said, I remain skeptical. While it is possible that, in
the absence of a misuse doctrine that is coextensive with
antitrust, some patent-related antitrust cases would go
undetected and un-remedied, there may be no way of knowing
how serious and how many such offenses there are. If the
misuse doctrine would bring only a small number of such
offenses to light, the administrative costs and the risk of false
positives may outweigh any possible benefits. More generally, if
antitrust standing rules are too strict (or other obstacles
preclude optimal antitrust enforcement), the more direct
solution to the problem would be to modify those aspects of
antitrust law. 39 Moreover, antitrust as it currently exists
already poses at least some risk of over-, as opposed to under-,
deterrence, given such features as the availability of treble
damages and attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs and the
possibility of indirect purchaser suits under state law. 40 To be
sure, none of this proves that some additional increment of
antitrust enforcement would be a bad thing; but it does call into
question the use of the misuse doctrine to accomplish that
purpose. By doing away with any standing requirement and
rendering misused patents unenforceable in their entirety, 41
prospect of securing a misuse determination with respect to the suppressed
patent. . . . because there is no need for Philips to assert the Lagadec patent
and open itself to a misuse defense.”) (citations omitted). To be sure, even in
the absence of a misuse doctrine, infringement defendants like the ones in
Princo II often might have an incentive to assert an antitrust claim or
counterclaim once the patentee has initiated litigation. See id. at 1333–34 n.6
(arguing, contra the dissenting judges, that antitrust law is adequate to the
task). But they may encounter serious problems in establishing antitrust
standing under current law. See Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489; Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 40–45.
39. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 935. Having special rules for
patent cases suggests that patent-related antitrust offenses are more likely to
escape detection, or to cause greater harm, than other forms of antitrust
misconduct. Perhaps this is so, but I’m not aware of any evidence that
supports it.
40. See Cotter, Procompetitive, supra note 13, at 526–27.
41. As noted above, unenforceability only lasts until the misuse is
“purged.” But the cases are surprisingly opaque on the question of what
constitutes purgation, as I discuss in Part VI below. If purgation requires the
patentee not only to cease the offending practice but to pay back any licensing
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the misuse doctrine risks overdeterring procompetitive or
neutral conduct that might be difficult to distinguish from
anticompetitive conduct. 42
In sum, a misuse standard that mirrors antitrust at best
facilitates the detection and enforcement of some antitrust
offenses that otherwise would go unremedied. How many such
offenses there are—and whether they are worth the
administrative and error costs of a misuse doctrine—remain
unknown. This analysis, if correct, hardly provides a ringing
endorsement of the optimal antitrust deterrence rationale.
III. THE SOCIAL WELFARE RATIONALE
In contrast to the optimal antitrust deterrence rationale, a
social welfare rationale might classify as misuse a broader
range of conduct that threatens to generate a surplus of social
costs over social benefits. In a sense, this rationale would turn
the misuse doctrine into something analogous to copyright’s
fair use doctrine, which can be thought of as a means for
constraining the exercise of copyright rights that otherwise
would threaten to reduce social welfare by, for example,
prohibiting Pareto optimal uses of copyrighted materials or
inhibiting positive externality-generating uses. 43 Some scholars
have argued that patent law would benefit from something like

revenue derived therefrom, it may in some instances approximate (and
therefore be subsumed within) an antitrust damages award relating to the
same offense. In others, however (such as Princo II) the penalty for misuse
may exceed any provable antitrust damages. This is a good thing only if
antitrust damages are systematically under-compensatory, which is hardly an
uncontested premise.
42. See Cotter, Procompetitive, supra note 13, at 539–40; Mark A. Lemley,
Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 1599, 1616–17 (1990); cf. Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The
Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 152
n.188 (1999) (“[T]here may be circumstances in which rules peculiar to patent
law make it appropriate to apply the misuse doctrine but do not warrant
invocation of antitrust law. . . . [But t]he application of the patent (or
copyright) misuse doctrines . . . should be coupled with a reasonable
mechanism to link the harm charged with the remedy administered . . . .”).
43. See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1276–83 (2008) (discussing a model of fair use that
assumes, generally, that copyright produces “net social benefits . . . by
encouraging the production and distribution of new works of authorship or by
conferring social recognition upon the labor and artistic judgment that goes
into the act of authorship . . . .”).
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a fair use doctrine, 44 or at the very least a more robust
experimental use defense, 45 that would free up some
unauthorized uses that might lead to improvements on
patented technologies. Both of these ideas may well have merit;
an experimental use defense in particular is widely accepted in
other patent systems. 46 Whether patent misuse could evolve
into something like a fair use doctrine, or even a more limited
experimental use defense, however, is far from clear.
Doctrinally, misuse involves more than simply refusing to
license one’s patent; 47 nor does insisting that the user pay or
refrain from using a valid patent necessarily threaten to
broaden the patent’s scope. 48 Moreover, fair use (in copyright) 49
and experimental use (in other countries’ patent systems) 50 are
usually characterized as privileges residing with the user. If
U.S. patent law were to recognize a fair or experimental use
doctrine, then perhaps a patentee’s refusal to acquiesce in the
face of a valid assertion of fair or experimental use rights could
be thought of as a type of misuse along the lines suggested in
Part V below. Such a characterization, however, would appear
to be logically dependent on the preexistence of a fair or
experimental use privilege, rather than the source of such a
privilege. 51 In addition, the penalty for misuse also presumably
44. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1177 (2000) (“[T]o ensure that patent law
achieves its constitutional goals, it should, like copyright law, use a fair use
defense to address problems of market failure. . . . such a defense that, while
modeled on copyright doctrine, accounts for and protects patent law’s
particular incentive scheme.”).
45. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 82 (“Patents
are intended to provide incentives to invest in research and
development,” but this is made difficult because “the research and
development process for a new invention requires the practice of a prior
patent.” . . . [and] prior patentees may be unwilling to license the experimental
use of their inventions on reasonable terms to potential competitors. . . . [Thus
a]n experimental-use exemption from infringement liability might be used to
skirt such prior patentee reluctance . . . .”).
46. See id. at 89 (“Such a broad exemption for ‘experimenting on’ patented
inventions is already available in many countries, including Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Japan.”).
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006).
48. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 914–15.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
50. See Strandburg, supra note 45, at 89–90.
51. Put another way, the word “misuse” seems to imply some sort of
affirmative conduct on the part of the patentee rather than a privilege on the
part of the user. Semantics may not be entirely irrelevant. See 35 U.S.C.
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would have to change if misuse somehow morphed into a fair or
experimental use doctrine. A valid exercise of fair or
experimental use rights should have no more bearing on the
general enforceability of the underlying patent than does a
valid exercise of fair use rights in copyright on the general
enforceability of the author’s rights under copyright law.
A more limited version of the social welfare rationale
would define misuse to include affirmative conduct on the part
of the patentee that otherwise would be lawful 52 but that
threatens a surfeit of social costs over benefits. In a sense, this
rationale could be viewed as grounded in the concept of
“broadening the scope”: a practice characterized as misuse is
one that broadens the patent’s scope beyond its optimal reach.
So stated, of course, the criterion presents a host of practical
problems. 53 How would courts know when that optimal reach
has been exceeded? How could they ensure consistency and
predictability in the application of such a standard? Perhaps if
patents actually had some readily definable “scope,” courts
could presume that efforts to extend that scope reduce social
welfare by altering the implicit cost/benefit tradeoff reflected in
the patent grant. The problem is that, in the misuse context,
when courts talk about “extending the scope” of the grant they
are not necessarily talking about claim scope (whether the
patent claims read on Embodiment X), a question that is posed
in most patent infringement cases and that is, if not always
easy to answer, at least answerable in concrete situations.
Rather, what they often are talking about is whether the
patent grant should be construed as permitting the patentee to

§ 271(d)(3) (2006) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . sought to enforce his
patent rights against infringement . . . .”).
52. Patentee practices that also violate the antitrust laws presumably
could still constitute misuse as well. The focus of the social welfare approach
would be on otherwise lawful practices, however.
53. For reasons of this sort, I have expressed doubt over the feasibility of
Professor Feldman’s proposal for a patent misuse doctrine that would account
for harms such as “(1) the social ‘waste that can occur with defensive research
or inventing around a patent, (2) the burden on innovation that can result
from an overproliferation of patent rights, and (3) the disincentives to
innovation that can result from allocating reward to early-stage inventors over
late-stage inventors.’” See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 942–43 n.179
(quoting Feldman, supra note 12, at 400).
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impose condition Y on a purchaser or licensee. 54 Back in the
days when courts believed that monopoly leveraging was
pervasive, the distinction between these two meanings of the
word “scope” may not have mattered much. One could envision
the tie at issue in Morton Salt, for example, as enabling the
patentee to expand its domain from salt machines to salt
tablets, which tablets were clearly dehors the patent claims.
Nowadays, however, courts and commentators realize that
many such ties do not enable patentees to expand their
domains in economically significant ways; 55 Morton may have
used the leverage of its patent to sell some quantity of
unpatented salt, but it never stood a realistic chance of
monopolizing the market for salt tablets. The right way to
phrase the “scope” question today, then, is to ask whether
allowing the patentee to impose condition Y threatens too many
negative consequences in comparison with the positive, where
the positive includes the marginal increase, if any, in the
perceived value of patent rights and the resulting inducement
to invent and disclose.
Unfortunately, once we decide to consider harms other
than competitive harms (or “public domain” harms, as
discussed in Part V) the question of determining the
appropriate “scope” of the patent is still, in my view, largely an
unanswerable one. Does the ownership of a patent entitle me to
impose post-sale conditions on the use of the patented article,
for example? The Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 56 arguably suggests that
a use in violation of such conditions would not constitute patent
infringement 57 (contrary to Federal Circuit precedent such as
54. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 936.
55. There is, to be sure, a lively debate on just how often such leveraging
may be feasible. Compare Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 410 (2009)
(arguing that monopoly leveraging is more common than the Chicago School
analysis suggests), with Paul Seabright, The Undead? A Comment on Tying,
Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit by Einer
Elhauge, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2009, at 243, 243–50 (challenging
Elhauge’s
analysis),
available
at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6166.
56. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
57. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 2d 575, 585–88 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (interpreting Quanta in this manner);
Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 106. I find the actual holding of the case to be
somewhat opaque, turning as it does on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the two agreements at issue as not forbidding Intel from selling parts to
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Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. 58 ), but that the immediate
purchaser might be liable for breach of contract. 59 The Court
did not intimate that a contract purporting to impose such
conditions would constitute misuse, however, and it would
probably be a mistake to conclude otherwise absent proof that a
particular post-sale condition threatened some sort of
competitive harm. Even assuming that the first-sale doctrine
promotes some social benefits other than merely competitive
benefits, 60 it is hard to see why an effort to curtail those
benefits should result in the unenforceability of the patent; the
penalty would seem disproportionate to the offense.
The more limited version of the social welfare rationale
nevertheless might make sense in some specific instances. An
exercise of patent rights that would undermine one or more of
the generally accepted purposes of the patent system, for
example, could be classified as misuse on the theory that in
such a case the social costs presumptively outweigh the social
benefits. One possible application of this theory is suggested in
a recent paper by Brenda Simon, who argues that the assertion
of patent rights to prevent researchers from engaging in quality
assessments of patented inventions undermines a key purpose
of patent law, namely encouraging scientific progress. 61
Quanta for Quanta to combine with non-Intel parts. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at
630–31. Nevertheless, the Court’s citation with approval of both General
Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), and United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942), may lend support to
Static Controls’ interpretation. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 631, 636.
58. 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that if a sale is validly
conditioned under other law and the restriction on reuse is within the scope of
the patent or otherwise justified, violation of the condition is actionable patent
infringement).
59. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 637 n.7.
60. In copyright, maybe it does; among other things, it makes public
libraries possible. See Cotter, Procompetitive, supra note 13, at 548–49.
61. See Brenda M. Simon, Patent Cover-Up, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1302
(2011). As Simon notes, given the importance of testing to the scientific
enterprise, licensing restrictions that prohibit testing for purposes of quality
assessment can be viewed as undermining the patent system’s purpose of
promoting the progress of the useful arts. See id. at 1314–17. By analogy,
copyright’s fair use doctrine permits unauthorized uses of copyrighted
materials for purposes of critique and commentary because a contrary result
would undermine the purpose of promoting the progress of learning. See, e.g.,
Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J.
ENTER. & TECH. L. 701, 739 (2010); see also Michael Steven Green,
Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 955–57 (2003) (arguing that the
exclusion of scientific theories from the scope of copyright protection rightly
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Standing alone, however, the misuse doctrine would provide no
defense against a patent infringement claim premised on an
unlicensed party’s unauthorized use of the patented invention
for purposes of quality assessment; for that, something more
akin to a fair use or experimental use privilege would be
necessary. 62 Similarly, perhaps efforts to constrain purchasers
from certain other practices such as reverse engineering should
be deemed sufficiently egregious to constitute misuse, because
such constraints inhibit the flow of information and thus on
balance do pose a net social loss. 63 As Glen Robinson has
encourages others to test those theories). As Simon also notes, however,
construing such restrictions as misuse would require the Federal Circuit to
overrule Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), which
specifically states that a “no research policy is a field of use restriction and is
also within the protection of the patent laws.”
Bohannan’s proposal that misuse doctrine should target innovation
harms, Bohannan, supra note 10, at 478, as well as Daryl Lim’s suggestion
that misuse might encompass deceptive conduct on the part of standard
setting organization members, Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting:
The Case for Patent Misuse (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in
Intellectual
Property),
available
at
http://www.atrip.org/Content/Essays/Daryl%20Lim.pdf, arguably also could be
viewed as falling within the more limited version of the social welfare
rationale sketched out above. See infra Part IV (discussing Bohannan’s
proposal in the context of the “beyond antitrust” rationale, but suggesting that
that rationale can be viewed as a special case of the optimal antitrust
deterrence and social welfare rationales). As discussed herein, however, I
believe that any such extensions of the misuse doctrine should be approached
with caution.
62. See Simon, supra note 61, at 1336, 1342–52. To the extent an
unlicensed party’s unauthorized use of a patented invention for purposes of
quality assessment is not privileged under current law, one might argue that a
license restricting the licensee from engaging in this type of use logically
cannot equate to misuse. The logic of the argument, however, would suggest
that tying arrangements could never constitute misuse either, because the
patentee could have chosen not to sell or license the patented tying article at
all. Courts nevertheless have clearly rejected the greater-includes-the-lesserargument as it applies to tying (and many other activities). See, e.g., Motion
Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514–15 (1917)
(rejecting the greater-includes-the-lesser argument); ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1259 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that “the argument . . . is often false,”
insofar as “[t]he law frequently permits a greater power but denies lesser
ones”). Even so, in the absence of a fair or experimental use defense the
misuse doctrine would have only a limited scope if it would target only license
restrictions.
63. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1621 (2002) (arguing
that, in general, reverse engineering probably generates a surplus of social
benefits over costs).
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observed, however, restrictions on reverse engineering probably
have had the most impact in relation to software-related
patents, due to the opacity with which such patents often are
drafted; 64 as a general matter, reverse engineering of patented
inventions should be unnecessary as long as the written
description is adequate. To the extent, if any, software patents
become less significant in a post-Bilski world, 65 the problem
may be self-correcting even without the intervention of the
misuse doctrine. In copyright, by contrast, the fair use doctrine
often permits the intermediate copying of software for the
purpose of reverse engineering, 66 thus obviating the need for
the misuse doctrine in that context as well.
IV. OPTIMAL DETERRENCE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE
CONDUCT THAT LIES BEYOND REACH OF ANTITRUST
The “beyond antitrust” rationale would provide a broader
role for misuse than would the “optimal antitrust deterrence”
rationale (though not as broad as the social welfare rationale)
by characterizing as misuse certain practices that threaten
anticompetitive harm that falls below the radar of antitrust. In
a sense, then, it combines (or can be thought of as a special
case) of the first and second rationales; and it is, I think,
identical to Professor Bohannan’s proposed “innovation harm”
rationale. 67 In previous work, I have suggested some reasons
64. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1449, 1510 n.219 (2004).
65. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225–31 (2010) (holding that
abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter, but declining to hold that
business methods or software-related inventions are per se patent-ineligible).
66. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599,
602–08 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993).
67. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 511–15. Although Professor
Bohannan distinguishes this sort of harm from competitive harm as defined by
antitrust law, see id. at 497–98, I am not sure that the concepts are
qualitatively different. To be sure, innovation harm principally threatens
dynamic, not static, efficiency. But why else would the plaintiff foreclose
future innovation if not to deflect the competitive threat it may pose in the
future?
To elaborate on this point just a bit, it is surely true that much of
patent and other IP doctrine can be thought of (ideally) as attempts to attain a
maximum surplus of social benefits over social costs. Rules relating to patent
term and scope, for example, can be imagined as efforts, however imperfect, to
attain such a goal. In a similar vein, the various rules relating to subject
matter, novelty, nonobviousness, disclosure, remedies, and so on also can be
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why this might be a sensible policy, while urging caution in its
application. 68 I will briefly repeat those arguments here and
explain why I believe caution is still warranted, Bohannan’s
(and others’) 69 arguments for a more robust misuse defense
notwithstanding.
The argument in favor of an expanded role for misuse in
policing more tenuous harms than antitrust typically
addresses, including possible (but difficult to prove) harms to
future innovation, runs like this. Because innovation promises
increasing returns, harms to innovation (dynamic efficiency
envisioned as attempts optimally to balance both the social benefits of the
patent system (invention, innovation, disclosure, and the like) and its social
costs (transaction costs, monopoly costs, and the like). Modifying any of these
rules thus may stimulate or inhibit innovation. Because the goals themselves
may sometimes be contradictory, however, and the optimal methods for
attaining them fraught with uncertainty, predicting the consequences of any
given modification is unlikely ever to be an exact science. See John M. Golden,
Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 528–29 (2010). More to
the point, the standards of proof that antitrust requires may not always be a
good fit for shaping IP policy. It may not be demonstrably clear, to cite one
patent reform proposal that has attracted much discussion over the years,
whether introducing a post-grant opposition procedure similar to that
employed in other countries would improve or reduce U.S. innovation;
policymakers nevertheless must make a choice, based on the best evidence
available, whether the possible benefits of such an experiment are worth the
potential risk.
So what does all this have to do with misuse? As I see it, the type of
conduct most commonly characterized as possible misuse—tying, package
licensing, and so on—surely can harm innovation in some instances, and the
risk of such harms surely could be evaluated using standards that depart from
antitrust. An IP policy designed to avoid false negatives at any cost, for
example, would be very different from standard antitrust policy. The question
I pose in the text above is whether there is any warrant for applying markedly
different standards. Given what I perceive to be a nontrivial risk of
substantial false positives flowing from wrongly condemning patentee conduct
as threatening innovation, I suspect the answer is, generally, no—though I
will concede there may be some special cases in which false positive risks are
small enough to warrant some departure from an antitrust-based policy.
68. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 957; Cotter, Procompetitive,
supra note 13, at 527–37, 539–40.
69. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of
Electronic Vigilitanism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out”
Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1192–94 (1995) (arguing that the misuse
doctrine may be preferable to antitrust for addressing harm to innovation);
Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 927–30 (2000); Lim, supra note 61; Ramsey Hanna,
Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse
Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 423–24 (1994); Note, Is the Patent Misuse
Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1934–36 (1997).
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harms) potentially dwarf any potential harms from short-term
monopoly pricing (static efficiency harms). 70 On this view, a
competition policy that focuses on static losses while ignoring
harms to dynamic efficiency would be perverse; and of course
modern-day antitrust law does concern itself with dynamic as
well as static harms, in a variety of ways. 71 The problem
nevertheless remains that dynamic harms are much more
difficult to predict and quantify; antitrust still has not figured
out how best to deal with this type of problem. Even efforts to
resolve the Arrow-Schumpeter debate (whether tolerating
monopolies in the short run is more or less likely to lead to
innovation in the long run) remain inconclusive. 72 With these
caveats in mind, however, one might nevertheless posit a role
for misuse that would extend the contours of the doctrine
beyond conventional antitrust law, while not envisioning the
sort of free-for-all inherent to a broad social welfare rationale.
The argument would be that certain practices carry a relatively
low probability of causing harms to future innovation, but if
they do cause such harms the harms will be severe. The
expected cost of a “false negative,” in other words, taking into
account not only the risk that such a harm will occur (which
may be low in a probabilistic sense), but also the magnitude of
any such harm (which may be high) may be, on balance,
unacceptably large. At the same time, curtailing the practices
that could give rise to such harms may reduce the patentee’s
expected profit by some amount, and thus could reduce to some
extent others’ incentives to invent and disclose. Curtailing
those practices also could give rise to more conventional false
positive harms (for example, by undermining the
procompetitive benefits of a legitimate joint venture that is
supported by the restraint at issue). But perhaps these risks of
false positives are simply not present (or otherwise are
acceptable) in some instances, such as when the patent has
already generated increasing returns on investment or other

70. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 247, 253–54 (2007); see also MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST LAW 3 (2009) (“[I]nnovation should be favored in the inevitable
tradeoffs that confront IP and antitrust law.”).
71. See Cotter, Procompetitive, supra note 13, at 525–26.
72. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 17–18 (2007).
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incentive schemes are also at work. 73 Thus, in some IP-related
contexts, the reluctance to incur false positives that seems to
explain much of contemporary antitrust law could be
counterproductive. Put another way, a competition policy that
takes into account the potential harms from lost innovation
opportunities may cast a more suspicious eye on patentee
conduct that probably will not cause long-run harm, but that
carries some nontrivial risk of causing substantial long-run
harm.
Of course, even if one agrees that competition policy should
focus more than it currently does on long-run harms to
innovation, the question still remains whether an expanded
patent misuse doctrine is a useful tool for accomplishing this
goal; the alternative would be to invigorate antitrust scrutiny
in such instances. To be sure, many commentators (such as the
members of the Antitrust Modernization Commission) have
cautioned against radically revising antitrust law in response
to new technologies; but they have done so precisely because, in
their view, antitrust is already sufficiently flexible and
adaptable to deal with “new economy” industries. 74 If current
73. See Cotter, Procompetitive, supra note 13, at 530–37. It may be the
patent system provides only a minimal additional incentive to invent or
disclose outside of a few select industries, such as pharmaceuticals. See
Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPs Agreement, 22
CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 307, 323 n.38 (2004) (citing Wesley M. Cohen et
al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why
U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper No. 7552
(Feb. 2000), at tbl. 1, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf), for
the proposition that “firms often rank patents below other reasons for
engaging in research and development, but that patents may be relatively
more effective at inducing research and development in some industries,
including pharmaceuticals, than in others.” For a recent paper arguing that, in
the context of damages calculations, courts sometimes can evaluate the
benefits and costs arising from patent protection on a case-by-case basis to a
greater degree than I generally have assumed in my scholarship, see Ted
Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies 28–29
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Program in Law, Science
&
Technology),
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Ted%20Si
chelman%20%20Purging%20Patent%20Law%20of%20Private%20Law%20Remedies.pdf.
MODERNIZATION
COMM’N,
REPORT
AND
74. See
ANTITRUST
RECOMMENDATIONS
31–46
(2007),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.p
df; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Reflections on the Antitrust Modernization
Commission’s Report and Recommendations Relating to the Antitrust/IP
Interface, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 753–54 & n.21 (2008) (noting agreement
with the commission’s position among other scholars).
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antitrust law is deficient in practice, economists may need to
devise better tools and courts to develop a deeper
understanding of the economics of innovation. But the rationale
for applying a broader definition of “harm” in the context of
patent misuse alone remains unclear. 75
In her paper, Bohannan suggests that the misuse doctrine
nevertheless may have a comparative advantage over antitrust
in addressing innovation harms because “the IP concern for
encouraging innovation is sufficiently strong to find . . . misuse”
in certain cases involving foreclosure of nascent technology,
whereas antitrust would require a stronger showing “that the
new product or technology would have come to fruition and
would have been successful but for the IP holder’s restraint.” 76
On this reasoning, an antitrust court might condone a package
license that includes nonessential patents on the ground that
no commerce is demonstrably foreclosed in the market in which
the nonessential patents compete; whereas the same conduct
might constitute patent misuse on the theory that (1) even a
minimal risk of foreclosure is serious and (2) condemning the
arrangement will not do much damage to the patent incentive
scheme. 77
The theory is coherent, but several considerations counsel
caution in its application. First, there is nothing inherent to
antitrust law that prevents courts from considering
consequences such as the harm to the patent (or copyright)
incentive scheme when evaluating a practice under some
version of the rule of reason. Indeed, antitrust courts may well
refer to such considerations in some recurring settings (for
example, grantbacks, 78 reach-through royalties, 79 and reverse
75. Perhaps one reason would be that patent courts can be more creative,
as it were, in discerning innovation harm than can antitrust courts, because
the penalty for a finding of misuse is “only” unenforceability and not treble
damages; hence the cost of false positives is lower in the misuse context than
in antitrust. At the same time, however, the misuse doctrine’s lack of standing
requirement undercuts to some extent the argument that the risk of false
positives is significantly lower than in antitrust. See also infra text
accompanying note 81 (discussing other possible justifications for a divergence
between patent and antitrust approaches).
76. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 514.
77. See id. at 508–10.
78. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.6 (1995),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (stating that,
in accordance with Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,
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payment settlements 80 ). If the facts so warrant, it is unclear
why courts could not take such effects into account in a broader
range of antitrust cases. 81 Second, the “false positive” cost of
wrongly condemning procompetitive conduct sometimes may
exist just as much in the misuse context as it does in the
antitrust context, even ignoring the harm (or lack thereof) to
the patent incentive scheme. In the context of package licenses
and patent pools in particular, a rule precluding pool
contributors from including nonexclusive licenses to
nonessential patents may increase transaction and search
costs. A misuse doctrine that too readily condemns such
practices may not give sufficient weight to the potential loss of
329 U.S. 637, 645–48 (1947), the agencies will evaluate grantbacks under the
rule of reason and that analysis should consider both the procompetitive
benefits of encouraging initial invention and disclosure as well as the potential
anticompetitive harm of discouraging licensee-generated innovation).
79. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 518–26 (arguing that reach-through
royalties may have procompetitive benefits and therefore should be evaluated
under the rule of reason); Feldman, supra note 12, at 447 (noting that the IP
Guidelines “provide[] insight into the way in which antitrust principles would
be applied to Reach-Through Royalties.”).
80. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1311 & n.27 (11th Cir. 2003) (adopting a standard that focuses on “the extent
to which antitrust liability might undermine the encouragement of innovation
and disclosure, or the extent to which the patent laws prevent antitrust
liability for such exclusionary effects.”).
81. Though perhaps the response would be that, if antitrust courts were to
start recognizing nascent harms to innovation markets as a form of antitrust
injury, there is no telling where they would stop. It may be important for
antitrust not to weaken the causal chain too much, lest it set bad precedent
that might wind up being applied in a non-IP setting. (The Federal Trade
Commission’s recently settled complaint against Intel raised similar questions
over how aggressively antitrust law should seek to prevent harms to
innovation, including harms that are merely “incipient.” Complaint, In re Intel
Corp.,
No.
9341
(F.T.C.
Dec.
16,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.). As I have argued
before, it may be preferable to apply IP doctrine (though not necessarily
misuse doctrine) to reduce some of the social costs of IP rights, “rather than
trying to stretch antitrust law to deal with perceived excesses in the exercise
of IPRs.” Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 942 n.179. One might also argue
that courts in IP cases consider incentive/access tradeoffs on a more frequent
basis than in antitrust cases, notwithstanding the antitrust counterexamples
noted above. Applying misuse doctrine to inchoate technology may seem less
troubling than applying antitrust law to the same facts. For some initial
thoughts on whether a patent misuse doctrine so understood would be
analogous to common law standards requiring courts to subject employee
noncompete agreements to heightened judicial scrutiny, notwithstanding
those agreements’ usual lack of anticompetitive harm in the antitrust sense,
see Thomas F. Cotter, Response, IP Misuse and Innovation Harm, 96 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 52, 57 n.30 (2011).
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these efficiencies, if for example, package licensing of the type
at issue in Philips were to constitute misuse. Third, even if it
makes sense in theory to have two distinct sources of
competition policy as it relates to long-run innovation—
antitrust and IP law—in practice a proliferation of legal
standards may succeed only in making a complicated area of
the law yet more complicated. If one will do, why have two?
Of course, even if one were to adopt the “beyond antitrust”
rationale as a source for misuse law it may not wind up
applying in a broad swath of cases. Even under this rationale,
the decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. 82 would be hard to defend,
as would some of the older case law on package licensing. 83 As
antitrust courts become better attuned to risks to future
innovation, perhaps any remaining differences between
substantive antitrust standards and misuse will disappear.
V. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN RATIONALE
In Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v.
WIREdata, Inc., 84 Judge Posner suggested in dictum that a
threat to file a spurious copyright infringement suit against
someone for using public domain materials could be viewed as a
type of copyright misuse. 85 Consistent with this rationale,
82. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
83. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
134–38 (1969) (holding that package licensing under which licensee paid
royalties based on total sales, regardless of whether licensed patents were
used, constituted per se misuse, unless entered into for the convenience of the
parties); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1408 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (following Zenith); see also United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962) (holding that block booking of films violates Sherman Act § 1),
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (similar). The
Federal Circuit’s analysis of package licensing in U.S. Philips is difficult to
square with the approach found in these cases, though it may be an
improvement as a policy matter. 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Cotter,
Misuse, supra note 13, at 920–23. But see TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE
RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 95-97 (2011) (arguing that block
booking may be undesirable because of its impact on culture and free
expression).
84. 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
85. The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the bounds of
antitrust, besides the fact that confined to antitrust the doctrine would be
redundant, is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain
property protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer,
hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an
opponent that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist
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Bohannan, 86 David Olson, 87 and I 88 (among others) all have
argued that assertions of copyright rights to leverage control
over facts or ideas plausibly could be characterized as a type of
misuse. The harm in such a case would not necessarily be
competitive harm but rather would be the distortion of the
balance that copyright law has drawn between protectable
expression, selection, or arrangement, on the one hand, and
unprotectable ideas and facts, on the other. Ensuring that
these elements remain in the public domain, in turn, may help
to prevent copyright from encroaching upon constitutional free
speech guarantees. 89
The question posed here is whether a public domain
rationale could provide a foundation for some applications of
patent misuse doctrine as well. Could a spurious claim of
patent infringement be viewed as an effort to leverage control
over subject matter that lies beyond the patent’s scope, and
thus as a type of patent misuse regardless of its impact on
competition? Although such “misuse” of patent rights (if that is
how one should refer to it), unlike some instances of copyright
misuse, typically would not risk undermining freedom of
speech, 90 it nevertheless could be viewed as undermining
effectively, is an abuse of process.
See id. at 647.
86. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 523–25.
87. See David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 544–54 (2010) (arguing for a more expansive version of
copyright misuse than I have advocated, citing the lack of any other effective
deterrent against exaggerated claims of copyright infringement).
88. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 903, 962 (suggesting that
abusive assertions of either copyright or patent rights might amount to
“litigation misuse”); Cotter, supra note 43, at 1301–03.
89. See Olson, supra note 87, at 605–06. In a sense, this rationale could be
viewed as a variation on the social welfare rationale discussed above, insofar
as the encroachment upon noncopyrighted facts and ideas could be viewed as
presumptively generating a surplus of costs over benefits.
90. It is possible that some assertions of patent rights risk interfering
with speech, liberty, or other constitutionally significant interests. I and
others have argued, however, that limitations on patentable subject matter
may be one way of addressing this set of problems. See Kevin Emerson Collins,
Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of Insufficient
Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759, 765–90 (2007); Kevin Emerson
Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 354–60 (2007); Thomas F.
Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, Part II: Reflections on the
(Counter)Revolution in Patent Law, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 365, 373–77
(2010); John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L.
REV. 569, 580–92 (2002); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (invalidating
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federal patent policy by excluding others from having access to
nonpatented, public domain subject matter. 91
Extending the patent misuse doctrine in this fashion,
patents on isolated human gene sequences, as being indistinguishable from
products of nature). Alternatively, scholars who oppose narrowing the scope of
patentable subject matter have argued that other patent doctrines (including
claim definiteness, nonobviousness, and inherency, to say nothing of existing
subject matter exclusions for abstract ideas, laws of nature, and naturally
occurring phenomena) may do much of the work of screening out patents that
would invade the public domain. See, e.g., Brief of 20 Law and Business
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 25–30, Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964). In any event, given these other
options, misuse doctrine is probably not a necessary or desirable tool for
addressing concerns that some patents might read on constitutionallyprotected subject matter.
91. Cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168
(1989) (invalidating state unfair competition law as in effect conferring patentlike rights on unpatentable subject matter); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1964) (invalidating state unfair competition law as
in effect conferring patent-like rights on an advance too insignificant to be
patentable); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38
(1964) (invalidating a state unfair competition law that prohibited the copying
of an unpatentable design). To be sure, the law of contributory infringement
sometimes allows patentees to control the sale of nonpatented parts, but that
is an intentional choice on the part of Congress. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note
13, at 910 n.37.
To the extent misuse doctrine can be viewed as a tool for preserving
the public domain, does this public domain rationale suggest as well that
license terms and technological restrictions that restrict access to the public
domain should be unenforceable too? See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 518–20
(arguing that, at least in the copyright context, it sometimes should); Olson,
supra note 87, at 599. But I’m not so sure that that argument holds up well in
the patent context. If the license or other restriction enables the patentee to
exercise its rights in some way that offends competition policy (rationales one
and three) or threatens significantly more costs than benefits (rationale two),
there is at least an argument (whether persuasive or not) in favor of
condemning the restraint as misuse. To argue that the restraint encroaches on
the public domain merely because it supposedly expands the scope of the
patent grant, however, assumes the existence of a baseline separating the
scope of that grant from the public domain. I have argued above that where
that baseline lies is not always self-evident, however, and needs to be defended
on the basis of consequences, not fiat. When, by contrast, a patentee asserts
nonexistent property rights against a defendant’s noninfringing product, it
may be plausible to characterize the patentee’s conduct as a type of abuse even
if that conduct threatens no competitive or other harm to anyone other than
the accused infringer. Assuming the requisite degree of bad faith on the part
of the patentee, there is nothing even plausibly of social benefit inherent in the
conduct. (Whether it is worth classifying the conduct as a type of misuse is
another question.) This is the distinction I have tried to draw in previous work
between transactional misuse, on the one hand, and litigation misuse, on the
other. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 962–63.
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however, most likely would trigger application of the NoerrPennington doctrine. 92 In order to overcome Noerr-Pennington
immunity, a plaintiff asserting an antitrust claim premised on
the defendant’s having engaged in an unlawful attempt to
monopolize by participating in “sham” patent or copyright
litigation must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 93 that
the patentee’s assertion of a claim of infringement was both
“objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits,” and
subjectively baseless in the sense that the lawsuit “conceals ‘an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor,’ through the ‘use [of] the governmental process—
as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an
anticompetitive weapon.’” 94 The Federal Circuit has extended
Noerr-Pennington immunity to claims asserting that the
defendant’s bad faith assertion of patent rights violates unfair
competition (e.g., commercial disparagement) law. 95 Thus, to
92. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment right to
petition the government provides a qualified immunity from antitrust liability.
See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–72
(1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 138 (1961). Subsequent cases extended the so-called Noerr-Pennington
doctrine to petitions directed at administrative agencies and courts in addition
to the legislative and executive branches. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972). As a general matter, then, it
is not an antitrust violation to procure a patent (even though the end result
may be that the patent confers monopoly power) or to assert (or threaten to
assert) a claim for patent infringement. An exception to this rule applies,
however, where the petitioning entity or entities engage in so-called “sham”
petitioning, that is, where “persons use the governmental process—as opposed
to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.” City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
93. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876–77 (Fed. Cir.
1985), overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovators,
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
94. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also
Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 1071–72 (“[A] sham suit must be both
subjectively brought in bad faith and based on a theory of either infringement
or validity that is objectively baseless . . . [or the] antitrust defendant’s
subjective motivation is immaterial.”).
95. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362
F.3d 1367, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that, for the prelitigation
communication of infringement of patent rights to constitute actionable
disparagement under state law, both the First Amendment and principles of
patent preemption require that the communication be both objectively and
subjectively baseless); Golan v. Pingel Enter., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2002); see also IGEN Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303, 310
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 128–
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prevail on a sham litigation-based antitrust claim or an
analogous unfair competition claim, the plaintiff not only must
succeed in stripping the defendant of Noerr-Pennington
immunity but also must prove the substantive elements of the
antitrust or unfair competition claim. Given these obstacles, it
is not surprising that both types of claims appear rarely to
succeed.
Although the matter may not be entirely free from doubt, 96
it is difficult to perceive why a misuse defense premised on
what is alleged to be a sham assertion of patent rights would
not similarly be subject to the Noerr-Pennington framework.
After all, the constitutional right to petition the government
could be undermined by a judgment of patent unenforceability
just as much as it could be undermined by a judgment for
treble damages. Consistent with this reasoning, the Federal
Circuit has held that when the misuse defense is premised on
the alleged wrongful enforcement of a patent it is subject to the
Noerr-Pennington framework. 97 Given these prior decisions, a
29 (3d Cir. 1999), for the proposition that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
“applies to common law claims of malicious prosecution, tortious interference
with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and
unfair competition”).
96. Contrary to the case law cited supra note 95, a few courts have
declined to extend Noerr-Pennington immunity to non-antitrust claims. See 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 18, at § 11.3b5, at 11-34 to -35 (citing cases).
Given the doctrine’s constitutional basis, however, the dominant (and better)
view is that Noerr-Pennington applies to any claim premised on sham
litigation. See id. If so, it is difficult to see why a misuse defense premised on
sham or abusive litigation should not also be subject to Noerr-Pennington.
Curiously, only a few discussions relating to whether abusive copyright
litigation can constitute copyright misuse explicitly mention the NoerrPennington issue. See Meg Dolan, Misusing Misuse: Why Copyright Misuse Is
Unnecessary, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 207, 233 (2007) (citing
G. Gervaise Davis III, The Affirmative Defense of Copyright Misuse and Efforts
to Establish Trademark Misuse, and Fraud on the Copyright Office:
Establishing Limitations on the Scope of Copyright Owners Rights Based on
Several Theories, 867 PLI/PAT 103, 138 (2006)); see also Int’l Motor Contest
Ass’n v. Staley, 434 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (D. Iowa. 2006) (“[T]he NoerrPennington doctrine does not bar these defenses to the extent that these
defenses are not based on the filing of IMCA’s lawsuit as the inequitable or
wrongful conduct.”) (emphasis added).
97. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“The conduct to which the jury instruction on misuse generally refers,
that is, ‘wrongful’ enforcement of patents, is activity protected under Noerr
and California Motor, and is not subject to collateral attack as a new ground of
‘misuse.’”); ERBE Electromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC, 529 F.
Supp. 2d 577, 587 n.4, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir.
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patent misuse defense arising from the sham or abusive
assertion of patent rights probably would apply in only a small
number of cases; as noted above, antitrust and unfair
competition cases in which plaintiffs have succeeded in
overcoming Noerr-Pennington immunity appear to be
uncommon. Moreover, the potential availability of an antitrust
or unfair competition claim in a case in which the plaintiff can
overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity reduces the need for a
misuse defense to cover the same ground. To be fair, a misuse
defense arising from abusive litigation could still pack some
punch in a case in which the infringement defendant could
prove the abuse but not the substantive elements needed to
succeed on an antitrust or unfair competition-based claim.
Thus, by rendering the patent unenforceable the prospect of a
successful misuse defense might provide some additional
deterrence against abusive assertions of patent rights. Even in
such a case, however, the infringement defendant would not be
without any remedy absent a misuse defense. The Patent Act
would permit the awarding of attorneys’ fees, 98 and with
appropriate facts the infringement defendant might be able to
assert a common-law claim for abuse of process as well. Finally,
extending the misuse doctrine to cover such cases could invite
infringement defendants to assert sham misuse defenses to
gain added leverage in settlement negotiations.
On balance, and in light of other existing alternatives, it
seems doubtful that the marginal benefits of extending the
patent misuse defense to cover abusive litigation as such would
outweigh the costs. Thus, while the public domain rationale
may provide a justification for some nontraditional applications
of a copyright misuse doctrine, it is difficult to foresee that
2010); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled
to relief for infringement . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse
or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . sought to
enforce his patent rights against infringement . . . .”). Indeed, C.R. Bard
appears flatly to reject the argument that asserting a claim of patent
infringement against products the patentee knows to be noninfringing
constitutes misuse, unless (perhaps) it also amounts to a sham litigation
antitrust violation. C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1373.
98. The act authorizes awards of attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases.” 35
U.S.C. § 285 (2006). Among the circumstances that “warrant a finding of
exceptionality in a patent case [are]: ‘inequitable conduct before the PTO;
litigation misconduct; vexatious, unjustified, and otherwise bad faith
litigation; a frivolous suit or willful infringement.’” Wedgetail, Ltd. v.
Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., 576 F.3d 1302, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
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rationale supplying much weight for an expanded doctrine of
patent misuse.
VI. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The analysis presented above calls into question the need
for any patent misuse doctrine, even if some version of the
doctrine is necessary in copyright to police the boundaries
between ideas and facts, on the one hand, and expression on
the other. Patent misuse doctrine may not do much harm if
misuse comprises only some set of substantive antitrust
violations; and in theory there could be a role for some limited
applications of misuse beyond the scope of antitrust, though I
believe that such instances are likely to be rare. If the patent
misuse doctrine cannot be scrapped altogether, however, it
could be reformed in some marginally helpful ways. Imposing a
standing doctrine would be a step in the right direction, 99 as
would clarifying exactly how a patentee goes about purging
misuse. 100 One could (largely) discard the characterization of
99. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 13, at 959–60.
100. As others have observed, “[t]here are no set standards for determining
when purge has occurred.” James B. Kobak, Jr., The Misuse Defense and
Intellectual Property Litigation, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2, ¶ 8 (1995). What
little black-letter there is can be summarized as follows. To demonstrate that
the misuse has been purged, the patentee must prove two elements: (1) that it
has abandoned the conduct constituting misuse, and (2) that the consequences
of the misuse have fully dissipated. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum
Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488, 493 (1942), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg.
Co., 328 F.2d 265, 278 (6th Cir. 1964); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity
Litig., 472 F. Supp. 170, 172 (S.D. Fla. 1979). Whether the misuse has been
purged is a question of fact. U.S. Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. at 465. Proving the
first element can be relatively straightforward. See, e.g., Preformed Line
Prods. Co., 328 F.2d at 278 (concluding that misuse had been purged when, as
a matter of corporate policy, the patentee officially ceased the improper tie,
notified customers that they were free to buy the tied product from any
supplier, and the effects of the anticompetitive conduct had dissipated).
Proving “the date when the consequences of . . . [the illegal] acts are
dissipated,” id. at 279, on the other hand, may be more difficult. See, e.g., U.S.
Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. at 473 (suggesting that absent specific evidence of
continuing effects, an extended lapse of time following abandonment of the
misuse may suffice to survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment);
Analytichem Int’l, Inc. v. Har-Len Assocs., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 271, 275 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (declining to enter summary judgment for defendant on defense of
misuse where plaintiff had stopped the improper conduct because “[f]urther
development of the record might show what impact” plaintiff’s corrective
measures had had in dissipating the effects of the misuse). Some courts also
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the doctrine as being equitable in nature and recognize that,
despite the historic analogy between misuse and the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands, under contemporary practice the
misuse doctrine (like other doctrines sometimes referred to as
being “equitable” in nature, such as the doctrine of
equivalents 101 and the fair use doctrine 102 ) is a mixed question
of fact and law (mostly law). 103 One also could clarify that the
have held that the dissipation requirement need not be satisfied where the
party asserting misuse did not prove anticompetitive consequences. See White
Cap Co. v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 203 F.2d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 1953); see also
Altmayer-Pizzorno v. L-Soft Int’l, Inc., 302 F. App’x 148, 157 (4th Cir. 2008)
(adopting this rule for copyright misuse).
101. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,
1521 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam) (noting that infringement by
equivalents is a question of fact, notwithstanding occasional characterizations
of the doctrine as “equitable”), rev’d and remanded on other grounds by 520
U.S. 17 (1997); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
493 F.3d 1368, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact, but that presumption of surrender
is a question of law).
102. See, e.g., Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (describing the fair use doctrine as presenting “a mixed question of law
and fact,” but also noting the doctrine’s sometime characterization as an
“equitable rule of reason”).
103. Recall that, under the Federal Circuit’s three-step framework, the
first question involves determining whether the challenged conduct is either
per se misuse or per se lawful. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d
860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). If it is neither, analysis proceeds to the second
question of whether the “practice is ‘reasonably within the patent grant, i.e.,
that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims.’” Id.
(quoting Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir.
1992)). If the practice is not reasonably within the scope of the patent grant,
the practice must then be analyzed in accordance with the “rule of reason.”
Under the rule of reason, “the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking
into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed,
and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
Whether the practice at issue is per se lawful or unlawful surely must
be a question of law; so too the question whether the practice is within the
“scope of the patentee’s rights,” given that claim construction is a question of
law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
Application of the rule of reason in antitrust, however, as the reference to
“finder of fact” in the Supreme Court’s (antitrust) opinion in Khan suggests, is
a question of fact. 522 U.S. at 10. Perhaps none of this matters much, if the
misuse defense (including its factual underpinnings) is understood as being a
matter for the court alone to decide. As I read it, however, the case law
remains unclear on the question of whether the matter is entirely one for the
court. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (reviewing jury determination of misuse); Va. Panel, 133 F.3d at 868
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infringement defendant is required to prove the predicate facts
comprising misuse by only a preponderance of the evidence,
and that a finding of misuse has preclusive effect. Authority in
support of these last propositions exists but, like the law on
purgation, is surprisingly meager. 104
Regardless of how these subsidiary questions are resolved,
the case for having a patent misuse doctrine at all remains
relatively weak. Uncertain in its application, potentially farreaching in its consequences, and unnecessary to the extent it
duplicates antitrust, patent misuse is a doctrine the rationale
(“When reviewing a jury finding on an equitable issue normally reserved for
the court such as patent misuse, we will first presume that the jury resolved
the underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave those
presumed findings undisturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Then, in a manner analogous to our review of legal conclusions, we examine
the conclusion de novo to see whether it is correct in light of the jury fact
findings.”) (citation omitted); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d
1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting, though not necessarily approving,
submission of misuse issue to the jury); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park
Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 720 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting, apparently with
approval, the process used in Yarn Processing, 472 F. Supp. at 173–74,
whereby “bench trials were conducted on purge of patent misuse and on
equitable defenses, and separate jury trials were conducted on validity under
§§ 102 and 103” thus “properly reserving equitable matters to the court”);
Maxwell v. Angel-Etts of Cal., No. CV9910516DT(AJWX), 2001 WL 34133507,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2001) (reporting jury verdict on misuse). I thank
Richard Stern for calling the discussion of this issue in Va. Panel, Structural
Rubber Products, and Yarn Processing to my attention.
The one respect in which the doctrine appears to remain grounded in
equity relates to its remedy: unenforceability, as opposed to invalidity, and
only until the misuse is purged. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548
F.3d 1004, 1025–26 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
104. See, e.g., Minebea Co. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 220–21 (D.D.C.
2006) (applying, without citation of authority, preponderance standard); GFI,
Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 619, 639 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (same).
Similarly, while a finding of unenforceability generally has preclusive effect,
see General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1413
(Fed. Cir. 1994), and commentators agree that a finding of misuse, like a
finding of invalidity, should have preclusive effect, see Kobak, supra note 100,
at ¶ 21, there appears to be no case law squarely on point. Assuming there is
preclusive effect, however, then by analogy to case law on the preclusive effect
of invalidity it would appear that other licensees could cease paying royalties
at least as of the date on which the judgment of misuse is entered. See PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 708 (6th Cir. 1976); see
also Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Would
they be entitled to recover payments made after the date on which the misuse
began? Would they have to resume paying once the misuse is purged? Are
these potential headaches worth the benefits, such as they are, of having a
misuse doctrine?
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for which remains largely elusive.
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